Oreon-Lime-R2/selinux-policy/selinux-policy-d9f4a2b/selinux-policy-d9f4a2bbeb91fd95d0c35a90936efb9ea99d2455/policy/modules/admin/su.if

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## <summary>Run shells with substitute user and group</summary>
#######################################
## <summary>
## Restricted su domain template.
## </summary>
## <desc>
## <p>
## This template creates a derived domain which is allowed
## to change the linux user id, to run shells as a different
## user.
## </p>
## </desc>
## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
## <summary>
## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
## is the prefix for user_t).
## </summary>
## </param>
## <param name="user_domain">
## <summary>
## The type of the user domain.
## </summary>
## </param>
## <param name="user_role">
## <summary>
## The role associated with the user domain.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
template(`su_restricted_domain_template', `
gen_require(`
type su_exec_t;
')
type $1_su_t;
domain_entry_file($1_su_t, su_exec_t)
domain_type($1_su_t)
domain_interactive_fd($1_su_t)
role $3 types $1_su_t;
allow $2 $1_su_t:process signal;
allow $1_su_t self:capability { audit_control audit_write setuid setgid net_bind_service chown dac_read_search fowner sys_nice sys_resource };
dontaudit $1_su_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow $1_su_t self:key { search write };
allow $1_su_t self:process { setexec setsched setrlimit };
allow $1_su_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow $1_su_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_netlink_socket_perms };
allow $1_su_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow $1_su_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms;
# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
domtrans_pattern($2, su_exec_t, $1_su_t)
# By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed.
corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_su_t,$2)
allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use;
allow $2 $1_su_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $2 $1_su_t:process sigchld;
kernel_getattr_core_if($1_su_t)
kernel_read_system_state($1_su_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_su_t)
kernel_search_key($1_su_t)
kernel_link_key($1_su_t)
# for SSP
dev_read_urand($1_su_t)
files_read_etc_files($1_su_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_su_t)
files_search_var_lib($1_su_t)
files_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dirs($1_su_t)
# for the rootok check
selinux_compute_access_vector($1_su_t)
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_su_t)
auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1_su_t)
auth_use_nsswitch($1_su_t)
auth_rw_faillog($1_su_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds($1_su_t)
init_dontaudit_use_fds($1_su_t)
init_dontaudit_use_script_ptys($1_su_t)
# Write to utmp.
init_rw_utmp($1_su_t)
init_search_script_keys($1_su_t)
init_getattr_initctl($1_su_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_su_t)
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
# RHEL5 and possibly newer releases incl. Fedora
auth_domtrans_upd_passwd($1_su_t)
optional_policy(`
locallogin_search_keys($1_su_t)
')
')
ifdef(`distro_rhel4',`
domain_role_change_exemption($1_su_t)
domain_subj_id_change_exemption($1_su_t)
domain_obj_id_change_exemption($1_su_t)
selinux_get_fs_mount($1_su_t)
selinux_validate_context($1_su_t)
selinux_compute_access_vector($1_su_t)
selinux_compute_create_context($1_su_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_su_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_su_t)
seutil_read_config($1_su_t)
seutil_read_default_contexts($1_su_t)
# Only allow transitions to unprivileged user domains.
userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_su_t)
')
optional_policy(`
cron_read_pipes($1_su_t)
')
optional_policy(`
kerberos_use($1_su_t)
')
optional_policy(`
# used when the password has expired
usermanage_read_crack_db($1_su_t)
')
')
#######################################
## <summary>
## The role template for the su module.
## </summary>
## <param name="role_prefix">
## <summary>
## The prefix of the user role (e.g., user
## is the prefix for user_r).
## </summary>
## </param>
## <param name="user_role">
## <summary>
## The role associated with the user domain.
## </summary>
## </param>
## <param name="user_domain">
## <summary>
## The type of the user domain.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
template(`su_role_template',`
gen_require(`
attribute su_domain_type;
type su_exec_t;
bool secure_mode;
')
type $1_su_t, su_domain_type;
userdom_user_application_domain($1_su_t, su_exec_t)
domain_interactive_fd($1_su_t)
role $2 types $1_su_t;
allow $1_su_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms;
allow $3 $1_su_t:process signal;
allow $1_su_t $3:key search;
# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
domtrans_pattern($3, su_exec_t, $1_su_t)
ps_process_pattern($3, $1_su_t)
# By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed.
corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_su_t, $3)
allow $3 $1_su_t:fd use;
allow $3 $1_su_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $3 $1_su_t:process sigchld;
kernel_read_system_state($1_su_t)
kernel_dontaudit_getattr_core_if($1_su_t)
auth_use_pam($1_su_t)
auth_write_login_records($1_su_t)
init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl($1_su_t)
mls_file_write_all_levels($1_su_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_su_t)
')
#######################################
## <summary>
## Execute su in the caller domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`su_exec',`
gen_require(`
type su_exec_t;
')
corecmd_search_bin($1)
can_exec($1, su_exec_t)
')