policy_module(kernel, 1.17.1)

########################################
#
# Declarations
#

## <desc>
## <p>
## Disable kernel module loading.
## </p>
## </desc>
gen_bool(secure_mode_insmod, false)

# assertion related attributes
attribute can_load_kernmodule;
attribute can_receive_kernel_messages;
attribute can_dump_kernel;

neverallow ~can_load_kernmodule self:capability sys_module;

# domains with unconfined access to kernel resources
attribute kern_unconfined;

# regular entries in proc
attribute proc_type;

# attribute for domains which read proc_t
attribute kernel_system_state_reader;

# sysctls
attribute sysctl_type;

role system_r;
role sysadm_r;
role staff_r;
role user_r;

# here until order dependence is fixed:
role unconfined_r;

role guest_r;
role xguest_r;

ifdef(`enable_mls',`
	role secadm_r;
	role auditadm_r;
')

#
# kernel_t is the domain of kernel threads.
# It is also the target type when checking permissions in the system class.
#
type kernel_t, can_load_kernmodule;
domain_base_type(kernel_t)
mls_rangetrans_source(kernel_t)
mls_trusted_object(kernel_t)
role system_r types kernel_t;
sid kernel gen_context(system_u:system_r:kernel_t,mls_systemhigh)

#
# BinderFS
#
type binderfs_t;
fs_type(binderfs_t)
genfscon binder / gen_context(system_u:object_r:binderfs_t,s0)

#
# DebugFS
#

type debugfs_t;
files_mountpoint(debugfs_t)
fs_type(debugfs_t)
dev_associate_sysfs(debugfs_t)

allow debugfs_t self:filesystem associate;
genfscon debugfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:debugfs_t,s0)

#
# kvmFS
#

type kvmfs_t;
fs_type(kvmfs_t)
genfscon kvmfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:kvmfs_t,s0)

#
# Procfs types
#

type proc_t, proc_type;
files_mountpoint(proc_t)
fs_type(proc_t)
genfscon proc / gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sysvipc gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_t,s0)

type proc_afs_t, proc_type;
fs_associate(proc_afs_t)
genfscon proc /fs/openafs gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_afs_t,s0)

# kernel message interface
type proc_kmsg_t, proc_type;
fs_associate(proc_kmsg_t)
genfscon proc /kmsg gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_kmsg_t,mls_systemhigh)
neverallow ~{ can_receive_kernel_messages kern_unconfined } proc_kmsg_t:file ~getattr;

# /proc kcore: inaccessible
type proc_kcore_t, proc_type;
fs_associate(proc_kcore_t)
neverallow ~{ can_dump_kernel kern_unconfined } proc_kcore_t:file ~getattr;
genfscon proc /kcore gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_kcore_t,mls_systemhigh)

type proc_mdstat_t, proc_type;
fs_associate(proc_mdstat_t)
genfscon proc /mdstat gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_mdstat_t,s0)

type proc_numa_t, proc_type;
fs_associate(proc_numa_t)
genfscon proc /numatools gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_numa_t,s0)
mls_trusted_object(proc_numa_t)

type proc_net_t, proc_type;
fs_associate(proc_net_t)
genfscon proc /net gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_net_t,s0)

type proc_security_t, proc_type;
fs_associate(proc_security_t)
genfscon proc /sys/fs/protected_hardlinks gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_security_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys/fs/protected_symlinks gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_security_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys/fs/suid_dumpable gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_security_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_security_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/kptr_restrict gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_security_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modules_disabled gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_security_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/randomize_va_space gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_security_t,s0)

type usermodehelper_t, proc_type, sysctl_type;
typealias usermodehelper_t alias sysctl_hotplug_t;
typealias usermodehelper_t alias sysctl_modprobe_t;
dev_associate_sysfs(usermodehelper_t)
fs_associate(usermodehelper_t)
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/core_pattern gen_context(system_u:object_r:usermodehelper_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hotplug gen_context(system_u:object_r:usermodehelper_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe gen_context(system_u:object_r:usermodehelper_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd gen_context(system_u:object_r:usermodehelper_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/usermodehelper gen_context(system_u:object_r:usermodehelper_t,s0)

type proc_xen_t, proc_type;
files_mountpoint(proc_xen_t)
genfscon proc /xen gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_xen_t,s0)

#
# Sysctl types
#

# /proc/sys directory, base directory of sysctls
type sysctl_t, sysctl_type;
files_mountpoint(sysctl_t)
sid sysctl gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_t,s0)

# /proc/irq directory and files
type sysctl_irq_t, sysctl_type;
fs_associate(sysctl_irq_t)
fs_associate_proc(sysctl_irq_t)
genfscon proc /irq gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_irq_t,s0)

# /proc/net/rpc directory and files
type sysctl_rpc_t, sysctl_type;
fs_associate(sysctl_rpc_t)
fs_associate_proc(sysctl_rpc_t)
genfscon proc /net/rpc gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_rpc_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/crypto directory and files
type sysctl_crypto_t, sysctl_type;
fs_associate_proc(sysctl_crypto_t)
fs_associate(sysctl_crypto_t)
genfscon proc /sys/crypto gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_crypto_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/fs directory and files
type sysctl_fs_t, sysctl_type;
files_mountpoint(sysctl_fs_t)
genfscon proc /sys/fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/kernel directory and files
type sysctl_kernel_t, sysctl_type;
fs_associate(sysctl_kernel_t)
genfscon proc /sys/kernel gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t,s0)

# /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid file
type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t, sysctl_type;
fs_associate(sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/net directory and files
type sysctl_net_t, sysctl_type;
fs_associate(sysctl_net_t)
genfscon proc /sys/net gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/net/unix directory and files
type sysctl_net_unix_t, sysctl_type;
fs_associate(sysctl_net_unix_t)
genfscon proc /sys/net/unix gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_unix_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/vm directory and files
type sysctl_vm_t, sysctl_type;
fs_associate(sysctl_vm_t)
genfscon proc /sys/vm gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_vm_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/vm/overcommit_memory
type sysctl_vm_overcommit_t, sysctl_type;
fs_associate(sysctl_vm_overcommit_t)
genfscon proc /sys/vm/overcommit_memory gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_vm_overcommit_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/dev directory and files
type sysctl_dev_t, sysctl_type;
fs_associate(sysctl_dev_t)
genfscon proc /sys/dev gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_dev_t,s0)

#
# unlabeled_t is the type of unlabeled objects.
# Objects that have no known labeling information or that
# have labels that are no longer valid are treated as having this type.
#
type unlabeled_t;
fs_associate(unlabeled_t)
sid unlabeled gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
allow unlabeled_t self:filesystem associate;

# Need the following because we are type alias of file_t.
files_type(unlabeled_t)
kernel_rootfs_mountpoint(unlabeled_t)
sid file gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
typealias unlabeled_t alias file_t;
neverallow * unlabeled_t:file entrypoint;

# These initial sids are no longer used, and can be removed:
sid any_socket		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid file_labels		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid icmp_socket		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid igmp_packet		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid init		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid kmod		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid policy		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid scmp_packet		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid sysctl_modprobe 	gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_fs		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_kernel	gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_net		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_net_unix	gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_vm		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_dev		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid tcp_socket		gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)

########################################
#
# kernel local policy
#

allow kernel_t self:capability2 ~mac_override;
allow kernel_t self:capability ~sys_module;
allow kernel_t self:key manage_key_perms;
allow kernel_t self:system { ipc_info module_request syslog_console syslog_mod syslog_read };
allow kernel_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
allow kernel_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow kernel_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow kernel_t self:msg { send receive };
allow kernel_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow kernel_t self:perf_event manage_perf_event_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow kernel_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow kernel_t self:sock_file read_sock_file_perms;
allow kernel_t self:fd use;

allow kernel_t debugfs_t:dir search_dir_perms;

allow kernel_t proc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_t:file read_file_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;

allow kernel_t proc_net_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_net_t:file read_file_perms;

allow kernel_t proc_mdstat_t:file read_file_perms;

allow kernel_t proc_kcore_t:file getattr;

allow kernel_t proc_kmsg_t:file getattr;

allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read_file_perms;

allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file read_file_perms;

allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir list_dir_perms;

# Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files
allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton;
# Kernel-generated traffic e.g., TCP resets on
# connections with invalidated labels:
allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:packet send;

# Allow unlabeled network traffic
allow unlabeled_t unlabeled_t:packet { forward_in forward_out };
corenet_in_generic_if(unlabeled_t)
corenet_in_generic_node(unlabeled_t)

corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(kernel_t)
# Kernel-generated traffic e.g., ICMP replies:
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if(kernel_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes(kernel_t)
corenet_raw_send_generic_if(kernel_t)
# Kernel-generated traffic e.g., TCP resets:
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(kernel_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(kernel_t)
corenet_raw_send_generic_node(kernel_t)
corenet_send_all_packets(kernel_t)
corenet_filetrans_all_named_dev(kernel_t)

corenet_ib_access_all_pkeys(kernel_t)
corenet_ib_access_unlabeled_pkeys(kernel_t)
corenet_ib_manage_subnet_all_endports(kernel_t)
corenet_ib_manage_subnet_unlabeled_endports(kernel_t)

dev_read_sysfs(kernel_t)
dev_search_usbfs(kernel_t)
# devtmpfs handling:
dev_create_generic_dirs(kernel_t)
dev_delete_generic_dirs(kernel_t)
dev_manage_all_blk_files(kernel_t)
dev_manage_all_chr_files(kernel_t)
dev_mounton(kernel_t)
dev_filetrans_all_named_dev(kernel_t)
term_filetrans_all_named_dev(kernel_t)

# Mount root file system. Used when loading a policy
# from initrd, then mounting the root filesystem
fs_mount_all_fs(kernel_t)
fs_unmount_all_fs(kernel_t)

selinux_load_policy(kernel_t)
selinux_compute_create_context(kernel_t)

term_use_all_terms(kernel_t)
term_use_ptmx(kernel_t)

corecmd_list_bin(kernel_t)

# /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe is set to /bin/true if not using modules,
# thus allow a transition into a minimal helper domain through generic bin
# types.
type kernel_generic_helper_t;
domain_type(kernel_generic_helper_t)
role system_r types kernel_generic_helper_t;
corecmd_bin_entry_type(kernel_generic_helper_t)
corecmd_bin_domtrans(kernel_t, kernel_generic_helper_t)

domain_use_all_fds(kernel_t)
domain_signal_all_domains(kernel_t)
domain_search_all_domains_state(kernel_t)
domain_connect_all_stream_sockets(kernel_t)
domain_rw_all_sockets(kernel_t)

files_manage_all_files(kernel_t)
# The 'execute' permission on lower inodes is checked against the mounter
# cred by overlayfs, so we need to grant it to allow overlay mounts created
# during early boot to work.
# In itself, this doesn't allow the kernel to execute all files - an 
# execute_no_trans permission or a type transition is also needed to grant
# that ability (and we are much more strict about those).
files_mmap_exec_all_files(kernel_t)

mcs_process_set_categories(kernel_t)
mcs_file_read_all(kernel_t)
mcs_file_write_all(kernel_t)
mcs_socket_write_all_levels(kernel_t)

mls_process_read_up(kernel_t)
mls_process_write_down(kernel_t)
mls_file_downgrade(kernel_t)
mls_file_write_all_levels(kernel_t)
mls_file_read_all_levels(kernel_t)
mls_socket_write_all_levels(kernel_t) 
mls_fd_share_all_levels(kernel_t) 
mls_fd_use_all_levels(kernel_t)
mls_process_set_level(kernel_t)

ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
	# Bugzilla 222337
	fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
    abrt_filetrans_named_content(kernel_t)
    abrt_dump_oops_domtrans(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	apache_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	gnome_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	kerberos_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	keyutils_request_domtrans(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	init_dbus_chat(kernel_t)
	init_sigchld(kernel_t)
	init_dyntrans(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	libs_use_ld_so(kernel_t)
	libs_use_shared_libs(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	logging_send_syslog_msg(kernel_t)
	logging_manage_generic_logs(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	mta_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	ssh_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
    storage_filetrans_all_named_dev(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(kernel_t, { file dir })
')

optional_policy(`
	nis_use_ypbind(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
    plymouthd_create_log(kernel_t)
    plymouthd_filetrans_named_content(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	# nfs kernel server needs kernel UDP access. It is less risky and painful
	# to just give it everything.
	allow kernel_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
	allow kernel_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;

	# nfs kernel server needs kernel UDP access. It is less risky and painful
	# to just give it everything.
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(kernel_t)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(kernel_t)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(kernel_t)
	corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(kernel_t)
	corenet_sendrecv_portmap_client_packets(kernel_t)
	corenet_sendrecv_generic_server_packets(kernel_t)

	fs_getattr_xattr_fs(kernel_t)

	auth_dontaudit_getattr_shadow(kernel_t)

	sysnet_read_config(kernel_t)

	rpc_udp_rw_nfs_sockets(kernel_t)

	tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_ro',`
		fs_getattr_noxattr_fs(kernel_t)
		fs_list_noxattr_fs(kernel_t)
		fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(kernel_t)
		fs_read_noxattr_fs_symlinks(kernel_t)

		files_read_non_security_files(kernel_t)
	')

	tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_rw',`
		fs_getattr_noxattr_fs(kernel_t)
		fs_list_noxattr_fs(kernel_t)
		fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(kernel_t)
		fs_read_noxattr_fs_symlinks(kernel_t)

		files_manage_non_security_files(kernel_t)
	')
')

optional_policy(`
	seutil_read_config(kernel_t)
	seutil_read_bin_policy(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	systemd_coredump_domtrans(kernel_t)

	# Systemd symlinks /usr/sbin/{poweroff,reboot} (which are invoked by
	# the kernel to perform an orderly poweroff/reboot) to
	# /usr/bin/systemctl, so we need to allow the kernel to execute it
	# and trigger the respective service unit.
	systemd_systemctl_domain(kernel)
	systemd_config_power_services(kernel_systemctl_t)
	init_read_utmp(kernel_systemctl_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	virt_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t)
')

optional_policy(`
	xserver_xdm_manage_spool(kernel_t)
	xserver_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t)
')

########################################
#
# Unlabeled process local policy
#

optional_policy(`
	# If you load a new policy that removes active domains, processes can
	# get stuck if you do not allow unlabeled processes to signal init.
	# If you load an incompatible policy, you should probably reboot,
	# since you may have compromised system security.
	init_sigchld(unlabeled_t)
')

########################################
#
# Kernel module loading policy
#

if( ! secure_mode_insmod ) {
	allow can_load_kernmodule self:capability sys_module;

    files_load_kernel_modules(can_load_kernmodule)

	# load_module() calls stop_machine() which
	# calls sched_setscheduler()
	allow can_load_kernmodule self:capability sys_nice;
	kernel_setsched(can_load_kernmodule)
}

########################################
#
# Rules for unconfined acccess to this module
#

allow kern_unconfined proc_type:{ file } ~entrypoint;
allow kern_unconfined proc_type:dir ~map;
allow kern_unconfined proc_type:lnk_file *;

allow kern_unconfined sysctl_type:{ file } ~entrypoint;
allow kern_unconfined sysctl_type:dir ~map;
allow kern_unconfined sysctl_type:lnk_file *;

allow kern_unconfined kernel_t:system *;

allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:dir ~map;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:{ lnk_file sock_file fifo_file chr_file blk_file } *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:file ~entrypoint;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:filesystem *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:association *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:packet *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:process ~{ ptrace transition dyntransition execmem execstack execheap };

#######################################
#
# Kernel system state reader policy
#

read_files_pattern(kernel_system_state_reader, proc_t, proc_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(kernel_system_state_reader, proc_t, proc_t)
list_dirs_pattern(kernel_system_state_reader, proc_t, proc_t)